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ACCOUNTING HISTORY AS A 
WORTHWHILE STUDY 
by 
W. T. Baxter 
University of London 
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following article is a 
transcription of Professor Baxter's comments at the 
banquet at the Third International Congress of 
Accounting Historians held in August, 1980. 
Your presence here proves that you look on 
history as a worthwhile study. But perhaps we 
should spare a moment to remind ourselves of why 
it is worthwhile. There are, after all, plenty of 
intelligent and successful men who dismiss history 
as a bore, and historical research as time wasted. 
So why, then, are you and I such devotees of 
history? One answer that perhaps springs glibly to 
the lips is that history is useful. This, as I shall try to 
show, is a notion that must be treated with 
profound caution. 
Nevertheless, I believe that some aspects of 
accounting history are indeed useful. Thus the 
beginner at bookkeeping must surely get a clearer 
grasp of the rules if he learns something about the 
origins of double-entry—origins perhaps in 
triangular credit transfers in an age of barter. He 
learns a more important lesson if he is taught that 
accounting was devised to keep track of personal 
accounts and simple physical objects such as cash, 
and that the income statement and balance sheet 
came later as mere by-products. Armed with this 
knowledge, he will respect his craft for what it can 
accomplish (a very considerable achievement), and 
will be cautious about extending its range. He will 
not be surprised if accounting seems to falter when 
called on to perform new and different tasks—such 
as predicting future income, and aiding investors to 
make decisions. If we have such ambitions for 
accounting, may we not be like a farmer who 
demands that his faithful old cart-horse learn the 
violin? 
Those who say that "history is useful" are apt to 
talk about the "lessons of history". But these 
lessons are far from clear. Hitler shot himself in the 
bunker; so the lesson of history is that dictators 
come to a bad end. Stalin died in his bed; so what 
has happened to that lesson ? The most that can be 
said for history's lessons, I suspect, is that they 
make us more alert to chains of cause-and-effects. 
But these chains are a matter of tendency and 
probability. A given cause, in one set of 
circumstances, leads to result A; in another set, it 
leads to result Z. 
Let us look at some of the lessons that are 
pertinent to accounting, and ask ourselves whether 
they are in fact useful or useless, true or false. We 
shall certainly have to admit that accountants in 
general either ignore them or dismiss them as 
untrue. 
Perhaps, for instance, ecclesiastical history has a 
lesson that is suggestive, and might have given us a 
wiser approach to inflation accounting. For here a 
major problem is how to cope with capital 
maintenance; the church in England has been 
wrestling with this very problem for a millenium or 
so. Surely we can learn some lessons from the 
church's experience? Let me remind you of the 
splendid article on this topic by Professor French. It 
runs somewhat as follows. 
Parish churches were founded by patrons. A 
pious lord gave land and money for the church, the 
churchyard, and the parsonage; he gave also glebe 
lands for the parson's sustenance. But, if the 
church was to be permanent, the parson had to 
keep these assets distinct from his own property, 
and hand them on intact to his successor. Alas, 
some parsons were careless or wicked. So the 
authorities had to devise a suitable law of 
ownership, and to define "intact". The law 
personified the parson's office as a corporation (a 
"conduit pipe through which this real property 
would pass to his successor"); and it obliged him to 
transmit the assets physically unimpaired. So here 
we have as to-day, the entity theory hand-in-glove 
with the doctrine of physical capital maintenance. 
The system has endured for centuries. Thus it 
cannot be wholly ineffective. But its economic 
faults are disturbing. 
Where physical assets are faithfully maintained, 
they may degenerate into fossils. For example, a 
London church was bombed during the war, and 
worship was transferred elsewhere; both 
worshippers and the Church of England would 
have gained if the site could have been put to fresh 
uses, but not even the courts had power to permit 
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this. Similarly, disused graveyards could not be 
given a new function. Again, the parson was 
obliged to live in, repair, and hand on a house that 
still conformed to its design of several centuries 
back; today his hard-pressed wife must cope with 
an unsanitary scullery and eleven bedrooms. He 
could not reduce the glebe land by sale (but who 
could stop him from exhausting it by bad 
farming?). He could not lease it for purposes other 
than farming, e.g. for much-needed houses. He 
could not extract its minerals, so they rested 
underground. He could not fell its trees for sales, so 
the wood was left to rot. 
Businessmen, who are not in the parson's strait-
jacket, can freely change physical assets and 
products to meet every new need. Church history 
suggests how profound such change may in time 
become. Attempts to compare the current with the 
original may be impossibly difficult. Accounting 
geared to physical assets or products must be 
suspect. But this basis now gets strong support. 
Yet another branch of history throws light on the 
development and pathology of professional groups. 
Our accounting societies have many points in 
common with the guild system (and many of the 
guilds survived far longer than any of our societies 
have yet managed to do). The guilds too were set 
up to foster their members' welfare-e.g. the 
Mercers; rules were "for the cherishing of unity and 
good among them, and for the common profit of 
the mistery". The guilds were better than we at 
social relations. For instance, members bought a 
hood and gown to wear at the annual feast, at 
funerals, "and on other solemn and great 
occasions". 
Guilds, like our societies, might try to win 
exclusive right for their members. Their declared 
motives were unimpeachable. Thus London guilds 
contrived to gain monopoly powers under the 
Stuarts to guarantee the consumer a supply of 
sound and serviceable commodities at reasonable 
rates. Where they won exclusive rights, the long-
run results were apt to be bad for both members 
and public; for instance, it has been suggested that 
the power of the guilds in German cities led to the 
latter's stagnation and decline, as innovators were 
driven outside the walls. 
Education was fostered by the guilds. Littleton 
has suggested that the uniformity of our debit-and-
credit rules may stem from the training system of 
apprentices by banking guilds of medieval Italy. 
Like our own bodies, guilds found that their 
members' interest might diverge in time. Members 
who were at first fairly equal in status would drift 
apart into groups of wealthy employers and 
permanent journeymen; they drifted also in 
different kinds of work, e.g. the more enterprising 
might give up manufacture for foreign trade. Then 
malcontents would in protest hive off and form 
their own sub-group within the guild; and a new 
body "which at the beginning of the fifteenth 
century had been a prohibited organization of 
rebellious journeymen, had before the end of the 
century been transformed into a recognized but 
subordinate branch of the livery company". Or 
there might be a complete secession and the 
formation of a new body. 
History here suggests that the task of a 
professional society cannot be easy. We are likely to 
see bitter splits and feuding-maybe between the 
Big Eight and the rest. Our societies are trying to 
solve an awkward and perhaps insoluble problem. 
Naturally enough, we all tend to exaggerate the 
significance of our own era. But we surely have 
some grounds for holding that, when the future 
historian traces accounting's history, he also will 
pronounce our period significant. Indeed, will the 
work "revolution" be too strong? Hitherto, 
accounting has been pushed forward by forces 
internal to firms. Obscure people, bent on 
improving their existing methods or meeting new 
needs, have continually made minor experiments. 
If an experiment failed, it was abandoned and 
forgotten; if it was a success, it was kept and in time 
copied in other firms. Accounting has thus grown 
by small steps, and is the creation of countless 
anonymous innovators. It is a good example of an 
unplanned evolutionary process that has, by and 
large, done remarkably well. 
Partly because of scandals and public criticism, 
all this has abruptly changed. The important steps 
are today prescribed from outside the firm, by 
paternal bodies acting for us collectively, 
sometimes backed by an arm of the state (e.g. the 
SEC). Henceforth, anonymous experiment will 
largely give place to public debate and directives: 
progress will be planned by our leaders, who will 
issue iron-clad guidelines; we shall all march in 
step. We have for the most part accepted this 
change readily, even enthusiastically. 
History offers some fairly close parallels. Take 
the scandals of the English cloth trade, from 
medieval times onwards. The clothiers were guilty 
of "many subtle sleights and untruths" (I quote 
from a 1552 Act). Among their "great defects and 
frauds'' was the use of coarser yarn for the middle 
than the ends of cloth. The cure seemed as obvious 
then as now. Standards were laid down. The state 
began this process in the twelfth century, and by 
the end of the eighteenth there were 311 laws on 
the wool trade alone. Uniform standards of quality 
and dimension were prescribed "the minutest rules 
were framed respecting the nature of materials, the 
use of mechanical devices, and the form of the 
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finished product." Enforcement was in the hands 
not only of the state but also of the guilds. Control 
was "committed to men of gravity" so that "the 
particular grievances and deceits in every trade 
might be examined, reformed, and ordered." 
These men had even the right of search. 
So how did the system work? Disappointingly. 
The well-meant rules tethered production to 
obsolete methods. They hindered mobility. They 
hampered response to the "humors" of customers, 
especially foreign customers. "There are now many 
laws in force concerning the making of cloth" the 
government confessed in 1622 "which for their 
number and contradiction do perplex and entangle 
the makers of cloth, and make it hard to be 
discerned what the law is in many particulars.'' The 
era of laisser-faire put most of the standards into 
the dustbin; it decided that alert buyers were better 
than standards as checks on quality. 
But, you may object, the analogy is imperfect. 
Today we are much more efficient at enforcement. 
And accounting standards are not concerned with 
physical qualities but with principles. 
Well, history has perhaps closer parallels. In 
1848, the safety of railway bridges was in doubt. So 
the government of the day set up a royal 
commission. Its brief was: 
to inquire into the conditions to be 
observed by engineers in the application 
of iron to structures exp>osed to violent 
concussions and vibration, and to 
endeavour to ascertain such principles 
and form such rules as may enable the 
engineer and mechanic in their 
respective spheres to apply the metal 
with confidence. 
Our great engineer Brunei looked with disfavour 
on the commission, which he privately renamed 
The Commission for Stopping Further 
Improvement in Bridge Building. So what was he, 
as a man of principle, to do when the commission 
asked him to give evidence? He solved the problem 
admirably. He sent the commission a letter 
beginning "I regret that the Commissioners should 
have done me the honour of requesting my 
opinion"; then he set out his objections to the 
commission's existence; he forced me to intrude 
my opinion on the Commissioners . . . having 
expressed my opinion, I shall attend their 
summons." 
What were his objections? His fear was that 
authorities would "lay down, or at least suggest, 
'rules" and 'conditions to be hereafter observed' in 
the construction of bridges, or, in other words, 
embarrass and shackle the progress of improvement 
tomorrow by recording and registering as law the 
prejudices and errors of today.'' He went on: 
Nothing has conduced more to the great 
advancement of the profession and to 
our pre-eminence in the real practical 
application of the science, than the 
absence of all regles de l'art. 
A system of binding rules, he affirmed 
is contrary to all sould philosophy, and 
will be productive of great mischief, in 
tending to check and control the extent 
and direction of all improvements. 
One part of Brunei's letter is even more germane 
to our current way of thought: 
No man, however bold or however high 
he may stand in his profession, can resist 
the benumbing effect of rules laid down 
by authority. Occupied as leading men 
are, they could not afford the time, or 
responsibility of constantly fighting 
against them—they would be 
compelled to abandon all idea of 
improving upon them; while 
incompetent men might commit the 
greatest blunder provided they followed 
the rules Devoted as I am to 
my profession, I see with fear and regret 
that this tendency to legislate and to 
rule, which is the fashion of the day, is 
flowing in our direction. You will, I 
fear, judge the commissioners to have 
been men of mean spirit, with none of 
today's desire to help brethren over 
difficult styles. 
Their long report ends: 
Considering the great importance of 
leaving the genius of scientific men 
unfettered for the development of a 
subject as yet so novel and so rapidly 
progressive as the construction of 
railways, we are of opinion that any 
legislative enactment with respect to the 
forms and proportions of the iron 
structures employed therein would be 
highly inexpedient. 
History may offer us yet another parallel in the 
medieval church's promotion of philosophy and 
science. Wise and saintly leaders revealed where 
truth lay, and put the stamp of authority on their 
pronouncements. And, when it came to 
enforcement of intellectual standards, we may 
doubt whether today's bodies such as the SEC are 
as persuasive as was the Inquisition. 
We can no doubt argue that twentieth-century 
accounting's eassays in standard-making differ 
from these earlier ones. Accountants should 
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certainly hope that, on this point, the lessons of 
history are indeed false and useless. If they are not, 
the disillusionment will be bitter. 
However, even if we cannot prove the muse of 
history to be useful, in the eyes of her devotees 
(such as you and me) she remains beguiling and 
beautiful. She can interest us, thrill us, delight us. 
She can add an extra dimension to our thought. To 
quote the first professor of history at Cambridge, 
"I call that man uncivilized who is not connected 
with the past through the state in which he lives, 
and sympathy with the great men who have lived in 
it". Finally, a lively mind is a curious mind, and 
the muse satisfies our sense of curiosity. This, I 
suspect, is her chief claim to our affection, the chief 
jurisdiction for her study. And, with your help, 
accounting history can become a worthy part of her 
great narrative. 
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